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Abstract  
 
This article argues that the countries of the global South have defined themselves in a globally-
positioned way since the 1960s - long before the current wave of neoliberal globalization or academic 
thinking about the ‘global South’. This is shown by tracing the history of the formation of the global 
South as a political bloc in the form of the Group of Seventy Seven, or G77, and in their aspirations 
and negotiations at the United Nations. The article explores how the G77 acts in the global political 
system, and how it tries to act on the global political system in order to produce a particular vision of 
the global. This is done through an analysis of some of the G77’s proposals of how to restructure the 
global order, including the NIEO and more recently in the UN’s Financing for Development 
conferences. The South’s vision of the global with stark disparities between North and South and their 
proposals to ameliorate the situation, is contrasted with a newly emerging Northern vision of the 
global which seeks to dissolve North and South into a neutral, holistic vision in which power and 
inequality is not salient.  
 
 
 
Introduction: The Global South in World Politics 
 
This paper argues that the countries of the global South have defined themselves in a globally-
positioned way since the 1960s - long before the current wave of neoliberal globalization or academic 
thinking about the ‘global South’. I show this by tracing the history of the formation of the global 
South as a political bloc in the form of the Group of Seventy Seven, or G77, and in their aspirations 
and negotiations at the United Nations. They have consistently defined their problems as being largely 
brought about by the unjust nature of the international order and have sought to improve their situation 
by using international law and global political processes to re-shape that order. Their raison d’etre as a 
political bloc has been to propose alternative visions of the global and to try to bring them into being. 
They have pursued this strategy consistently from the 1960s right up to today1. 
 
The terms ‘developing countries, ‘third world’, ‘poor countries’, ‘South’ and ‘global South’ are often 
used interchangeably by scholars and policy-makers. But this belies the significant differences in the 
various conceptual frameworks that underlie the different terms. Whilst ‘developing countries’, ‘poor 
countries’ and (most of the time) ‘South’ are based mainly on an economic categorization of the 
countries of the world, ‘third world’ and ‘global South’ emphasize political positions in global power 
relations. While the first group of terms emphasize poverty, under-development and backwardness, 
the second group emphasize marginal positions within global systems of decision-making. Whilst the 
economic-based terms draw a picture of the world as divided between rich and poor countries without 
calling into question why these wealth differentials exist, the political-based terms stress that this 
wealth inequality results from unequal power relations within the global order. It is perhaps 
noteworthy that many scholars and politicians from the North tend to emphasize the economic 
aspects, while those from the South more often focus on the political nature of their predicament.  
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The two political terms, ‘third world’ and ‘global South’, are based on different political analyses of 
the world situation and closely align with two different political groupings that formed soon after the 
former colonial territories in Africa, Asia and Latin America gained independence – the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and the Group of Seventy Seven (G77). The NAM conceived of itself as a group 
of countries not aligned to either of the two big superpowers (the USA and the USSR) or their 
ideologies (capitalism or Stalinist communism). Instead they sought to find their own alternative path 
to development, whilst stressing non-involvement in the Cold War and anti-imperialism (Gupta 1992: 
65). The G77, on the other hand, perceived themselves as countries that were at a structural 
disadvantage in the international economic order (Najam 2003). They thus sought to unite as a 
political bloc in order to try to change the international economic system through the then new 
international organisations of global governance, particularly the United Nations.  
 
In this article I will interrogate the global South as both a political concept, and in the form of the 
G77, as a political actor in the global system. The G77 has been described as the “influential and 
authentic voice of the global South” in international politics (Najam 2003:213).  Today it has over 130 
members. China supports the group and often acts with it, although is not a member, and thus many 
statements are made in the name of ‘the G77 and China’. On its website the G77 describes itself as: 
 
the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the United Nations, 
which provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their 
collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major 
economic issues within the United Nations system… (www.g77.org/doc).  
 
I will focus on the activities of the G77 at the UN, where the member countries of the G77 self-
identify as being the global South, and where most discussions tend to split on fairly clear North-
South lines (Malone & Hagman 2002).While the G77 often use the terms ‘South’ and ‘global South’ 
interchangeably, and also frequently refer to themselves as ‘developing countries’, their analysis of 
their situation and their proposed solutions are consistent with the global political framework implied 
in the concept of ‘global South’, ie. one based on a particular positionality in an unjust world system. 
 
This article seeks to explore how the G77 acts in the global political system, and in particular, how it 
tries to act on the global political system and tries to shape it in order to produce a particular vision of 
the global.  Thus rather than focusing on the nature of the ‘South’ within the term ‘global South’, this 
article instead problematizes and explores the nature of the ‘global’. At its centre is an exploration of 
the alternative vision of the ‘global’ that the G77 is calling for, and how this contrasts with the 
dominant vision of the global held by the North. Whilst it is often claimed that ‘there is no alternative’ 
to neoliberal globalization, it remains the case that the G77 have been proposing alternatives for 
decades.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section looks at the history of the G77 and some of their 
more well-known proposals of how to re-structure the world order, The following section looks at 
some of the most important global discussions that have taken place in the twenty first century about 
the shape of the future global order – those that have taken place within the framework of the UN’s 
Financing for Development conferences – and discusses some of the different visions proposed by 
actors from the North and from the South. The fourth section then focusses on the discussions that 
took place at the most recent Financing for Development conference which took place in Addis Abeba 
in 2015 and analyses in depth the different visions of the global called for by the global South and the 
global North. Finally, the conclusion revisits the concept of the ‘global South’ and suggests that it 
indeed has continuing salience in global political analysis and struggles. 
 
 
The G77 and their Vision of the Global 
 
The history of the G77 is intimately tied up with their analysis of their marginalized positionality in 
the global economic order. In the early 1960s a number of countries from three different continents - 
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Africa, Asia and Latin America - came together to call for an international conference on trade issues 
under the auspices of the UN. This led to the first UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in June 1965. At this conference these developing countries voted together as a bloc for 
the first time, ignoring their internal differences and conflicts of interest. In the one-country-one-vote 
system of the UN they thought that by sticking together they could secure majority votes and thus 
bring about change through the international political system. This, however, turned out not to be the 
case, as out-voted developed countries simply refused to offer the concession on which they had been 
out-voted (Toye 2014:1761). Nonetheless, the 77 developing countries saw the potential in working 
together in this way and at the end of the conference they signed the Joint Declaration of the Seventy 
Seven Developing Countries, pledging mutual cooperation in the common cause of a new world order. 
A few years later, in October 1967, they held their first Ministerial meeting in Algiers where they 
constituted the group as a permanent organization. 
 
The formation of the G77 was seen as radical and surprising at the time. Dominant narratives saw the 
three continents as differing sharply in their background, culture and developmental needs. But in its 
formation the G77 created a different narrative based on unity, complementarity, cooperation and 
solidarity between the politically marginalized countries in the global order. Although the G77 talked 
about themselves as ‘developing countries’, using the dominant terminology at that time, they clearly 
saw themselves quite differently and in a way that fits much closer with the term ‘global South’, even 
though this term was only to be developed several years later. 
 
Throughout the 1960s the developing countries mobilized under the auspices of the G77 and 
advocated reform of the laws governing international economic relations that reflected their post-
colonial demands for control over economic activity within their own borders, for participation in the 
governance of the globalizing economy, for fair access to technology, and for improved terms of 
international trade, finance and investment (Salomon 2013: 36). In the 1970s, as their numerical 
superiority in the UN grew, they instituted a deliberate campaign to change the existing international 
economic structure and the law which supported it (Ellis 1985:655). In the early 1970s the G77 set out 
for the first time its vision for a global society in its Declaration of the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). In it they proposed an alternative global order, which in their 
words would be: 
 
based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation 
among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct 
inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap 
between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating 
economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future 
generations (United Nations 1974:1). 
 
Their proposed alternative world order was not based on liberalism, but on a kind of neo-
Keynesianism that emphasized state sovereignty and the role of the state in shaping and regulating 
markets (Krasner 1985). In this alternative vision of the global there would be no imperialism or neo-
colonialism but the sovereign equality of states and self-determination of all peoples. All states would 
have full sovereignty over their natural resources and the ability to regulate transnational corporations 
that operate within their borders. At the international level all states would participate equally in 
decision-making about global economic issues and cooperate to solve economic problems in a just and 
equitable way. Efforts would be made to minimize the disparities in wealth that existed between 
developed and developing countries by extending financial assistance without conditionalities, by 
improving the terms of trade, by ensuring the flow of finance to developing countries and by 
reforming the international monetary system 
 
Although the resolution on the NEIO was passed at the UN General Assembly the world order that it 
proposed did not come into being. Nonetheless the G77 have continued to develop their ideas about 
alternative ‘globals’ and continued to try to bring them about through the institutions of global 
politics. Thus it is the case that many of the North-South debates at the UN are fundamentally debates 
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about alternative world orders.  In the next section I will look at some of the most important UN 
discussions about the nature of the future world order – those that have taken place within the 
framework of the UN’s Financing for Development conferences. 
 
The G77 and Financing for Development 
 
Financing for development (FFD) has been one of the central concerns of the G77 since its formation. 
The issue loomed large in the first UNCTAD conference in 1965, was a major element of the NIEO in 
the 1970s and has continued to be a major concern to the present day. For many decades the G77 has 
called for a financing for development process to be held at the UN. It was only in the late 1990s, after 
a series of high profile UN conferences calling for various development actions and in the context of 
both the Asian financial crisis and the new millennium, that a UN Financing for Development process 
was finally agreed.  
 
The first UN Conference on Financing for Development was held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 and 
was followed by a second conference in Doha in 2008. In between the General Assembly held 
biannual High Level Dialogues on Financing for Development to follow up on implementation, thus 
keeping the issue firmly on the UN agenda. In 2015, in parallel with discussions about the post-2015 
development agenda and the sustainable development goals (SDGs), a third FFD conference took 
place in Addis Abeba. 
 
The first conference in Monterrey was in many ways a landmark event. Not only was it the first time 
that high level discussions about global finance had taken place under the auspices of the United 
Nations, it was also the first United Nations conference to bring together governments, the IMF, the 
World Bank and the WTO, plus business and civil society, to try to find a shared solution to a global 
problem (Bouab 2004:359, Haque 2004: 219, Nunnenkamp & Thiele 2013:75). It was also unusual in 
that the discussions did not focus just on the traditional development topics, but also looked at more 
mainstream financial issues such as trade and investment, foreign debt, establishing domestic financial 
markets, and reforms to the international financial system.  
 
Despite wide-ranging discussions and proposals that circulated before the conference – which 
included all manner of innovative proposals for financing development such as global taxes, a global 
lottery and using Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to fund development (Atkinson 2004a, 2004b, 
Herman 2013) - the outcome of Monterrey was far from innovative. The final document set out a 
development focus on poverty reduction set in the context of a general neoliberal framework of 
economic growth (Martens 2002:4). It suggested a varied mix of financing options including Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), or aid, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), trade and debt relief. 
Northern countries pledged to give more aid and also to offer more debt relief in what was hailed as a 
new ‘partnership of solidarity’ between the North and the South. The private sector was encouraged to 
contribute to development through increased foreign direct investment, trade was seen as an ‘engine of 
development’ and open markets and liberalisation were applauded.  Little in the status quo was 
changed. NGOs criticised the Monterrey Consensus as simply being “the Washington consensus 
under a sombrero” (Martens 2007:1). In Doha the outcome was much the same – a compromise mix 
of policy proposals in a broad neoliberal framework with little change from Monterrey. 
  
In the Monterrey and Doha conferences negotiating positions did not diverge on clear North-South 
lines. Whilst the South mainly put forward a united position as the G77 and called for NIEO-type 
reforms, the Northern countries had quite different positions on many issues. In particular there was a 
significant split between many of the European countries, which favoured more progressive policies 
and were open to discussing several of the more innovative options, such as a currency transaction tax 
to fund development or the establishment of a Global Economic and Security Council, and the 
JUSCANZ bloc of Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, who strongly 
resisted any moves in that direction.  
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However after the 2008 financial crisis the political-economic landscape began to change as most 
Northern governments found themselves extremely short of money while private capital was in search 
new places in which to invest. Thus between the Doha conference and the third FFD conference in 
Addis Abeba a number of policy ideas were developed in Northern think tanks and international 
business forums and widely disseminated in various North-dominated international policy networks 
(eg. IRF 2015, Kharas & McArthur 2014, Sandor et al 2009, World Economic Forum 2012, 2014a, 
2014b).  The 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan in 2011 was particularly influential 
in reformulating the Northern position, as was the project on Redesigning Development Finance 
which was carried out by the OECD and World Economic Forum and in which many senior 
politicians and business people were involved. The result was that by the time of the Addis Abeba 
conference the North had, for the first time, unified around a widely agreed set of policy proposals.  
 
Over the same period the South had grown more diverse. China and India, along with Brazil, Russia 
and South Africa had become significant economic forces and had gained geopolitical importance 
with the formation of the BRICS grouping and the inclusion of their leaders in the newly reformulated 
G20. Meanwhile the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) were falling even further behind. Thus the unity of the Global South, always somewhat fragile, 
was becoming more and more difficult to sustain (Toye 2014). In other UN forums, particularly in the 
discussions on climate change, inter-South disagreements were so intense that the G77 was 
threatening to disintegrate. However in the FFD process the G77 managed for the most part to put 
their differences aside and to negotiate as one bloc. Thus the Addis conference in 2015 is particularly 
significant because this was the first time that there was a marked North-South split and an extremely 
contentious battle between two clearly defined policy positions regarding the shape of the future 
global order. 
 
 
The 2015 Financing for Development Debates  
 
The negotiations in the run-up to the Addis conference were extremely tense and heated affairs 
(Muchhala 2015). Observers remarked that there was a marked clash between the positions of the 
North and South (IISD 2015). Extra drafting sessions were added but still agreement could not be 
reached. In the end the final document was only agreed at the Addis conference itself after a series of 
closed-door meetings between key countries from the North and South. Some of the points of 
contention were the role of the private sector, the nature of Official Development Assistance (ODA or 
‘aid’), the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), the integration or 
separation of climate and development issues, debt relief and tax. But in this article I will argue that in 
order to understand what was really at stake in these negotiations it is necessary to not get lost in the 
minute details of each disagreement, but instead to step back and look at the two negotiating positions 
as whole policy visions about the nature of the future world order. Analysed this way we can see that 
the North and the South were in fact proposing different ways of ‘producing the world’ – they were 
arguing for different visions of ‘the global’.  
 
Based on a review of publically available documents from the drafting sessions, articles and reports 
produced by observers, and interviews with civil society representatives who were present in Addis 
during the conference, this paper seeks to bring into focus the different visions of the ‘global’ of the 
North and the South in 2015.  
 
 
The ‘Global’ of the Global South  
 
The vision of the global proposed by the South was in many respects a reformulation of the vision 
encompassed in the New International Economic Order (NIEO). In this vision separate countries have 
their own sovereignty and make their own decisions about the best policies and approaches to 
development. These countries are then embedded in a loosely connected international order in which, 
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they argue, the rules should be democratically decided by all countries and should be based on a 
relationship of solidarity between the rich North and the poor South.  
 
This vision can be seen in the statements made by representatives of the G77&China, the African 
bloc, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) as well as by individual countries of the South. Throughout the negotiations they 
continually stressed the importance of a global order in which independent national governments were 
in charge of the development processes within their countries. In line with this they stressed that it was 
fundamental that governments have enough policy space to make their own decisions about national 
policies. For example, in their comments at the second drafting session, the representative of the G77 
and China said: 
 
The issue of policy space for national governments must also be respected. Individual 
Member State regulations on public domestic financing must be the prerogative of 
national governments, in accordance with their own specific needs and objectives. (G77 
& China 2015:3) 
 
In line with the vision of sovereign governments in charge of the development processes within their 
own countries the South also placed considerable emphasis on the need for public sector funding and 
they argued repeatedly that “public funding should always take precedence over private financing” 
when it comes to matters of development and poverty reduction (G77 & China 2015c:1). This vision, 
we can see, is what drove their negotiating positions with regard to ODA, to tax, and to debt. 
 
They argued that ODA is vitally important for developing countries and must remain central to 
development financing. They criticize Northern countries for not meeting the ODA commitments that 
they made at previous Financing for Development conferences and urge them to pledge to increase 
their aid in the coming years. For example in the second drafting session the representative for the 
G77 & China said: 
 
The Group of 77 and China … is of the firm view that ODA represents the major source 
of financing for the development of many developing countries and it must target the 
eradication of poverty in its multiple dimensions (G77 & China 2015:3). 
 
They also noted that in recent years the amount of ODA they receive has been decreasing as there has 
been a new trend to channel ODA to humanitarian disasters and to in-country programs in the North, 
for example to fund refugee assistance. And they further feared that the re-framing of ‘development’ 
as ‘sustainable development’ would mean that the supposedly additional funds promised for climate 
initiatives will in fact be taken from existing ODA budgets. Thus they argue for these different things 
to be delineated and measured clearly. 
 
Above all they argue that ODA is an expression of the ‘partnership of solidarity’ between the North 
and the South and they reiterate the need for a global partnership for development. For example in the 
second drafting session the G77 representative said: 
 
The Group of 77 and China calls upon developed countries to agree and commit to a new 
phase of international cooperation through a strengthened and scaled-up global 
partnership for development, which should be the centrepiece for completing the 
unfinished business of the MDGs and implementing the post-2015 development agenda 
(G77 & China 2015:5-6)  
 
Again and again they stress that ‘partnership’ means partnership between Northern and Southern 
countries and they further argue that this partnership should be based on the Rio Principle of Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) – a principle that was developed in 1992 in the context of 
the Rio Earth Summit and stipulates that whilst all countries share a common responsibility to protect 
the environment this responsibility is differentiated according to the historical pressure that that 
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society has placed on the environment and the technologies and financial resources which they 
command. The countries of the South argued that this principle sets out the balance of universality, 
differentiation and responsibility that previous international agreements had defined and should be 
also applied to the responsibility for sustainable development. Thus at the third drafting session: 
 
The traditional definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA), based on North-
South Cooperation, should be maintained, with a reaffirmation of the fact that ODA 
remains the main source of international financing for development for many developing 
countries. It should be based on quantified and time-bound targets that are consistent 
with, and build upon, MDG-8, the global partnership for development, which must of 
necessity be re-invigorated and strengthened, and in accordance with the principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) (G77 & China 2015b:1) 
 
As well as ODA they also emphasise that the ability to collect tax revenue is extremely important in 
generating public funds to finance development. A main issue here is the matter of tax avoidance and 
tax evasion, particularly by multinational companies. This was stated clearly for example by the 
representative of the African Group at the first drafting session: 
 
It is vitally important to address tax evasion of transnational companies and domestic 
enterprises… Africa realizes that efforts for curbing illicit financial flows (IFFs) transcend 
national and regional boundaries. They drain foreign exchange reserves, which limit the 
capacity of our countries to import. They also negatively affect domestic resource 
mobilization by reducing the tax collection base. Additionally, they undermine the rule of 
law, stifle trade and worsen countries macroeconomic conditions. (African Group 
2015a:2) 
 
Since multinational companies are adept at finding ways to avoid paying taxes in developing countries 
by using loop holes in tax treaties and tax laws, they urgently call for the creation of an international 
tax body at the UN through which all countries can come together and democratically decide on how 
to reform the international tax system to minimize the possibilities for tax avoidance and evasion. At 
present there is a UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. This 
committee is very small and under-resourced, with just two permanent staff and only has non-
governmental status.2 The Southern countries call to upgrade this committee into an inter-
governmental committee on tax cooperation which could then act as a norm-setting body on tax 
matters. In this form it would be able to act as the central forum for all countries to come together to 
discuss and agree on international tax issues and would be the centre point in designing a new 
democratic and just global tax system. For example, during the third drafting session the 
representative of the G77 & China said:  
 
There needs to be agreement on the upgrading of the Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters and the Statistical Commission to inter-
governmental entities. We have talked about these issues for a long time now, and there is 
a need to address them sooner rather than later (G77 & China 2015b:1). 
 
This idea was in fact initially proposed in the 1990s by Vito Tanzi, then Director of Fiscal Affairs at 
the IMF. It formed one of the recommendations of the Report of the High-Level Panel on Financing 
for Development in 2001 and has been supported in various UN reports and statements since then 
including most recently in the Synthesis Report of the Secretary General on the Post-2015 Agenda in 
2014 (United Nations 2014). Civil Society actively pushed for it in the preparations for the Monterrey 
Conference and it even made its way onto the zero draft of the Doha Declaration. In Addis, as I have 
mentioned, it was the largest point of contention between the North and the South and was the final 
issue that caused the negotiations to be extended. 
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Along with ODA and tax, the South emphasized the importance of sustainable debt restructuring 
mechanisms in order to free up public money to spend on development activities. So for example in 
the first drafting session the representative of the G77 & China said: 
 
Lack of sustainability of external debt can be a main obstacle to development, economic 
growth and poverty eradication and an impediment to human rights and achieving greater 
equity (G77 & China 2015d:1) 
 
They call for the development of an international system of debt re-structuring as soon as possible. In 
the words of the Moroccan Ambassador, speaking on behalf of the African Group: 
 
We need to establish an international debt resolution mechanism to guarantee, a just and 
equivalent treatment for creditors and debtors. In this regard, we welcome the adoption by 
the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 68/304 "towards the establishment of 
a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes" … with the 
purpose to elaborate and adopt, through a process of intergovernmental negotiations, a 
multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes (Africa Group 
2015c:2) 
 
The South is also in support of various innovative financing mechanisms that have been discussed 
both before and after Monterrey. These include various global taxes, such as a currency transaction 
tax, the development of a global lottery, the use of SDRs to fund development, and many other 
initiatives that seek to find new sources of public funds for development. These are very contentious 
issues and the US makes sure that these ideas do not make their way into any final outcome document 
other than in vague references to ‘innovative finance for development’. 
 
The next part of their vision is that sovereign countries should be part of a fair and democratic 
international system. They often highlighted the unfairness of the present system and how it made 
things very difficult for developing countries. They thus called for an ‘international enabling 
environment’ for development. For example, the representative of G77 & China said in the first 
drafting session: 
 
Developing countries should be supported by an enabling international environment, 
which includes a supportive and just economic and financial international system where 
the rules are fair and pro-development (G77 & China 2015c:3) 
 
To bring this about they continue to ask for more democratic and representative global governance 
arrangements such that countries from the South will have an equal voice in intergovernmental 
organisations such as the World Bank, IMF and the WTO, which are today dominated by the countries 
from the North. While they managed to get a whole range of global governance reforms into the zero 
draft  - including a sovereign debt restructuring body, a global health fund to bring together existing 
global health funds, an ad hoc advisory body to review the role of multilateral and regional 
development banks, commodity stabilization funds, increasing developing country participation in the 
Financial Stability Board, and implementing reforms in International Financial Institutions – not one 
of them made it into the final outcome document (IISD 2015).  
 
The vision of the South regarding financing for development centres around public sector funding. 
They do, of course, acknowledge that the private sector has a role to play, but stress repeatedly that 
this is a secondary role. They argue that since companies primarily seek to make profit they cannot be 
relied upon to bring about positive development outcomes without external regulation and 
supervision. Thus throughout the negotiations they argued that the emphasis should be less on the 
private sector and more on states. Whilst they were keen to attract private capital to their countries 
their views about the best way to do this differed markedly from that of the North. 
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They acknowledged that foreign direct investment was important, but they also stressed that it does 
not necessarily bring about development outcomes and would need to be significantly changed to do 
so. For example in the first drafting session the representative of the African Group said: 
 
It is equally important to highlight that achieving [development outcomes] must include a 
change in the mindset of private investors to ensure that their investment decision making 
is not based on profit only, but must incorporate sustainable development needs (African 
Group 2015b:2) 
 
They also called for more regulation of transnational companies and appropriate guidelines for all 
forms of investment. Likewise, whilst they accepted that trade is important for development and could 
provide an engine for growth in developing countries they also noted that: 
 
This will always be elusive to the G77 and China as long as a universal, rule-based, open, 
non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system is not agreed upon. This 
should also be one of the key deliverables in the Addis Ababa Outcome Document. (G77 
& China 2015c:2) 
 
Putting all this together we can see that the vision of the global presented by the South is one in which 
sovereign states decide their own policies whilst being embedded in a loose international community 
which democratically makes a minimum number of global rules. Governments raise public funds from 
taxing business and citizens and use this to provide public services and carry out some degree of 
redistribution. A global tax body enables governments to collect taxes from transnational corporations 
operating in their borders, and globally-agreed debt relief mechanisms ensure that government funds 
are not lost to overseas creditors. Private capital is attracted, encouraged to engage in development 
activities and is properly regulated. Internationally there is cooperation and solidarity between the 
states of the North and those of the South expressed in flows of ODA. In this vision of the global 
efforts are made to remove structural inequalities between the North and the South in order to create a 
just and democratic global order. 
 
 
The ‘Global’ of the Global North  
 
In sharp contrast the Northern countries argued for a completely different way of conceptualizing 
international development and its financing.  They repeatedly argued for a radical paradigm change 
and claimed that the post-2015 development agenda, and the way of financing it, must be something 
radically new. The key elements of this radical new vision of the global were a move away from a 
North-South conceptualization of the world towards a universal vision, the bringing together of 
development and climate issues, and a major new role for the private sector. To give an example of 
the emphasis on changing approaches, here is a quote from the EU representative at the second 
drafting session: 
 
The zero-draft does not fully capture the paradigm shift towards a universal agenda that 
has taken place since Monterrey and that the SDGs will concretely reflect, and remains 
overly premised on an outdated North-South understanding of the world (EU 2015: 2) 
 
The new vision of the North – promoted by all the Northern countries along with the EU and the 
OECD - is one of development being led by global capital and private investment. The emphasis is 
very much on the private sector. They thus stress that ODA can only form a tiny part of development 
finance and are generally not supportive of attempts to help developing countries increase their tax 
collection from multinational companies or to reduce debt burdens beyond the most extreme. Their 
focus is on increasing economic integration with more foreign direct investment and more trade. As 
the UK representative said at the first drafting session: 
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Working in partnership with the private sector to generate real progress is … at the core 
of our collective forward agenda (UK 2015a:1) 
 
And again by the EU in the second drafting session: 
 
Ensuring the right form of engagement by the private sector, and incentivising its positive 
contribution to sustainable development, will be one of the key challenges for the 
implementation of the post-2015 agenda (EU 2015:3) 
 
In order to manifest this particular agenda the focus of the North was on finding ways to facilitate 
global capital to do business in developing countries. In this view governments need to be responsive 
to the requirements of global capital and do what is necessary to attract it to their countries. For 
example, the US representative said in the first drafting session: 
 
The Addis outcome document must also recognize that capital will naturally flow to 
countries where investors believe they can get a good rate of return and their investments 
will be protected. To attract and enhance inflows of productive capital for maximum 
development impact, countries need to create a transparent, stable and predictable 
investment climate, with proper contract enforcement and respect for property rights (US 
2015b:1) 
 
To this aim they emphasised three key issues: a domestic level enabling policy environment, public-
private partnerships and various mechanisms to improve the risk-return ratio for companies.  
 
In the vision of the North governments, and in particular Southern governments, should step back 
from leading and implementing and should instead focus on ‘enabling’.  The key role of governments 
in their vision is to provide the right policy environment that will enable global capital to do business 
in Southern countries. Throughout the negotiations the North repeatedly stressed the need for an 
‘enabling environment’ at national level. Against the calls of the South for ‘policy space’ the North 
emphasized the importance of all countries having the right mix of policies and regulations that would 
enable capital to flow across national borders with minimum transaction costs and which would focus 
on guaranteeing property rights, safeguarding investments and reducing taxation and regulation. At 
the second drafting session the EU representative put it this way: 
 
The policy dimension of the document should be strengthened significantly by stressing 
the centrality of stable and enabling environments, sound, effective and coherent policies, 
effective institutions and good governance. Policy coherence by all countries and at all 
levels will be key in moving towards poverty eradication and sustainable development 
(EU 2015:1). 
 
The ‘right policies’ in this vision are largely policies that have been developed in the North. This in 
particular includes new the tax norms that were recently set out in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) guidelines of the OECD and the OECD’s recently-revised Policy Framework for Investment 
(PFI). In both of these cases supposedly global norms were devised by the Northern countries with the 
expectation that they would be implemented by all. These particular policy norms were mentioned 
frequently in the negotiations, with the BEPS process being mentioned when the South called to move 
tax negotiations to the UN. In contrast to the South’s call for inclusive and democratic rule-making at 
the global level, the vision of the North calls for an order where global rules should be decided by a 
small group of Northern countries. 
 
Along with an enabling policy environment the North stressed the importance of public-private 
partnerships to facilitate private sector involvement. The US representative set out how he saw the 
respective roles of the public and private sectors in his intervention in the first drafting session: 
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[Along with finance] the private sector also provides management skills, information 
technology and can connect producers to value-chains. In turn, the public sector supports 
creation of the necessary policy environment and mitigates risk (US 2015b:2) 
 
In this vision it is the private sector that should be implementing development activities rather than 
Southern governments, while Southern governments should concentrate on enabling policies and risk 
mitigation. There is a focus on infrastructure, and in particular large scale infrastructure projects. In 
order to incentivize the private sector to invest in this traditionally risky area the North sought ways to 
‘de-risk’ these projects so that their ‘risk-return profile’ would be attractive to investors. They 
proposed finding projects that would generate adequate revenue streams, for example in the form of 
user payments or debt servicing, and then creating a pipeline of such ‘bankable’ projects. They 
proposed that national governments would take on much of the risk of these investments though a 
range of new financial mechanisms. 
 
To this end the North suggested that a good use of ODA would be to finance some of these risk-
reduction mechanisms. Thus alongside general statements that ODA was no longer the main 
mechanism to finance development and acknowledgements that its levels were declining, the North 
proposed that ODA be made ‘smarter’ by using it to leverage private sector investments through such 
de-risking mechanisms. So for example at the first drafting session the representative of Switzerland 
said: 
 
ODA will be nowhere near sufficient to finance the ambitious and universal Post-2015 
agenda we are all striving for. Therefore, the Addis Ababa outcome will have to show 
how ODA can be used in a smart way to leverage other sources of financing for 
sustainable development (Switzerland 2015::2) 
 
And at the second drafting session the OECD representative reiterated much the same thing: 
 
We are also working on making ODA “smarter” by promoting its strategic use to catalyse 
other sources of funding, including private investment which is a critical resource for 
sustainable development (OECD 2015b:2) 
 
Throughout the negotiations there was repeated emphasis on these new forms of ‘blended finance’ in 
the form of guarantees, first loss funding and various mechanisms that blend ODA with private 
finance. For example at the first drafting session the representative of Canada set it out like this: 
 
Public-private blended finance, represent an essential part of the solution to the Financing 
for Development gaps. Blended finance will …  allow us to mobilize additional capital 
for development by mitigating risk (Canada 2015:1). 
 
Similar thoughts come at the second drafting session from the EU representative: 
 
We would ask the co-facilitators to balance the text on public-private and multi-
stakeholder partnerships and innovative finance including blending, guarantees, equity, 
and other risk-sharing instruments, so as to have a more holistic approach to leveraging 
funding (EU 2015:3) 
 
In this new vision ‘partnership’ is not a relationship of solidarity between the governments of the 
North and the South, but instead a business relationship between governments and companies. Thus 
the ‘global partnership for development’ is subtly transformed to ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships for 
development’. For example, at the second drafting session the EU representative said: 
 
[W]e believe that the Addis outcome needs to stress the multi-stakeholder character of 
the global partnership, able to mobilise action by all countries and stakeholders at all 
levels (EU 2015:3) 
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And again from the US: 
 
Multi-stakeholder partnerships and blended financing approaches… are gaining currency 
as the new model for support to development and should be welcomed (US 2015:2) 
 
In this vision of private sector financed development, the role of Southern governments as providers 
of public services is severely diminished. And raising public funds is correspondingly less important. 
Only minimal public finance needs to be raised, according to this vision, in order to provide some 
basic kind of social protection for the very poorest in these countries. Underlying the narrative of a 
‘global social compact’ in which ‘no-one is left behind’ is a fact a vision in which it is the poor who 
will be paying for the social protection of the poorest. This is because in the vision of the North social 
protection mechanisms should be funded from domestic tax revenues, with a focus on collecting taxes 
from citizens of their own countries. The North adamantly blocked any attempts to focus on how 
developing countries could stop tax avoidance by multinational companies or democratize global rule-
making regarding taxation and instead focused on initiatives to build the capacity of domestic tax 
administrations to broaden their tax base and collect more taxes from their citizens. 
 
So we can see that the North is trying to use the Financing for Development discussions to produce a 
new conceptualization of the global by re-framing the roles of state, society and market. Their vision 
emphasizes increasing international economic integration and stresses the primary role of global 
capital. In order to facilitate the flow of capital across borders governments are called to adhere to 
global policy norms and must essentially follow the same economic approach everywhere, which 
includes limited regulation and taxation and reduced state provision of public services. In their 
proposed world order public funding is of only secondary importance and the role of ODA, tax and 
debt relief are negligible. There is no language of solidarity or cooperation between North and South 
and instead a vision of a universal world order is presented. 
 
 
Conclusion: The Global South and Alternative Visions of the Global  
 
This analysis of the 2015 Financing for Development negotiations has shown two clear and 
contrasting visions of the ‘global’ presented by the North and the South. These visions of the global 
did not, of course, appear out of nowhere on the occasion of this conference. The global vision of the 
South has a long history and many of its elements can be discerned behind many other debates at the 
UN, from the discussions about the so-called New International Economic Order in the 1970s, through 
inter alia negotiations about the right to development in the 1980s, discussions about the MDGs in the 
late 1990s, and its declaration of a New World Order for Living Well in 2014. The global vision of the 
North, as a shared and coherent vision, has a rather more recent history, emerging in the post-Cold 
War order and in early twenty first century discussions about aid effectiveness. In the 2015 Financing 
for Development discussions we can see, for the first time, the full policy vision of each side and with 
it the vision of contrasting world orders. Here we see the countries of the global South presenting a 
vision of the global with stark disparities between North and South, while the global North presents a 
contrasting vision of ‘an equator-less landscape of a multi-stakeholder global partnership’ (Eyben & 
Savage 2013). 
 
Scholars have argued that the term ‘global South’ emphasizes the place of the countries of the South 
in the global political system and theorizes existing global power relations, inequalities and hegemony 
in ways that enable challenge and resistance (Levander & Mignolo 2011, Mahler 2015). This paper 
has shown that the countries of the global South, acting together as the G77, have held such an 
analysis long before the coming into fashion of the term ‘global South’. And based on their analysis of 
global power relations they have developed their own a vision of an alternative world order, an 
alternative ‘global’, and sought to bring it into being through discussions and negotiations at the UN. 
The global North has consistently tried to resist these attempts, most recently by creating a contrasting 
vision of the global which dissolves any difference between ‘North’ and ‘South’. This is perhaps the 
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greatest indication that the terminology of ‘global South’, and the theoretical framework which 
underlies it, indeed has significant political and symbolic power. 
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Notes 
 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Global South Studies Center at the University of Cologne 
in May 2017 and has benefitted from the thoughtful questions and comments that were raised there. I am also 
grateful to comments from Sinah Kloss and from the anonymous reviewer. 
 
2 The Committee is a subsidiary body of ECOSOC and was originally established in 1968 as the Ad Hoc Group 
of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries with the specific remit of creating a 
model double taxation treaty between developed and developing countries. In 1980 it was re-named the "Ad Hoc 
Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters” and its remit and membership were expanded to 
include a broader range of tax issues. In 2004 it was again re-named and became the Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters. It currently has 25 members who are tax experts appointed by their 
governments meet annually in Geneva for 5 working days per year 
                                                          
